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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

This is an action tw recover dtumjies ror personal injuries suffered when plaintiff was electrocuted while
working on a construction site near energized, uninsulated high tension wires belonging to defendant Flowell
Electrical Association, Inc. A similar action brought by
the Guardian ad Litem of one of plaintiff's co-workers
is currently pending before this court. See Olsen t \ Industrial Commission, et al., Case No. 1 3867.
1
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge,
granting defendant Flowell Electrical Association's motion for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's
complaint against defendant Flowell Electrical Association with prejudice and on the merits. (R. 78-79.)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff prays for the court to reverse the aforesaid
summary judgment and remand the case for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff was electrocuted on September 6, 1972, at
the construction site of Interstate 15 near Meadow, Millard County, Utah. (R. 2.) On that date a crew employed
by the general contractor, Cox Construction Company,
was engaged in pouring the concrete deck for a southbound lane of a north-south highway overpass. (R. 2.)
When a concrete pump designed to place the wet cement
on the upper deck failed to operate properly, Brent Cox,
the company's superintendent for concrete construction,
ordered his crew to continue with the help of a 40 ton
American crane positioned at the southern end of the
overpass. (Cox Deposition at 24, 35-36.)1 Plaintiff was
on the deck releasing cement from a bucket attached to
the crane's 50 foot boom when the boom either touched
or came into close proximity with live, uninsulated, high
iThe Deposition of Brent Cox is part of the record in Olsen v.
Industrial Commission, et ah, Case No. 13867, pending before the court.
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voltage transmission lines owned and operated by defendant Flowell Electrical Association. (R. 2.) As a
result of the contact with the overhead transmission lines,
plaintiff was struck down by 14,400 volts of electrical
current which passed from the wires, through the boom
and bucket, and into his body. (R, 2; Robinson Deposition at 50.) Although the electrical shock was not fatal,
plaintiff's injuries were so se\ere that he was required
to undergo amputation o! both ham's and irms below
the elbow together with extended medical and surgical
treatment for burns ?.nd re h red n«n«* *^mi;ie- (R ?..)
Three or four days before this needless tragedy, Brent
Cox contacted FlowelT's manager, Ralph Robinson, and
asked him to move the power lines out of his construction area. (Robinson Deposition at 1 6.) Robinson refused but agreed to meet Cox at the construction site for
a joint inspection of the area. (Robinson Deposition at
17, 19-20.) While present at the site, Robinson became
aware of the potentially dangerous situation existing
there, but was concerned about interrupting service to
customers on the line. (Robinson Deposition at 22.) He
informed Cox ih a if :!v;ro were an* possible way to
pour the concrete without cutting the power he would
appreciate it. (Cox Deposition at 15.) (.ox informed
Robinson that the crane might be required to complete
the job, and Robinson agreed to cut the power if Cox
would notify him beforehand. (Robinson Deposition at
22-2j.) Cox i:hi:n LOUI Rohiasen c!-.-i-: he intended to
P'MW in ;i da> or two. i Robinson Deposition at 46.)

3
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When the work in the danger area began, it soon
became evident to Cox that the crane would have to
be used to complete the southern portion of the deck.
(Cox Deposition at 24-27.) He therefore left the work
site and personally drove to Flowell's office in Fillmore
to ask Robinson to cut off the power. (Cox Deposition
at 24, 27.) When he arrived, however, he was unable
to locate or contact anyone from Flowell either at its
office or anywhere in town. (Cox Deposition at 32.) With
a full crew standing by and loaded cement trucks waiting, Cox then ordered the work to proceed. (Cox Deposition at 26, 36.)
Following the electrocution of Darwin Jensen and
Randy Olsen, the local sheriff became concerned that the
live wires over the work site might fall and kill or injure more persons. (Robinson Deposition at 49.) But
although the electrocutions occurred in early afternoon,
even the county sheriff with his knowledge, experience,
and resources was unable to locate anyone from Flowell
until 5:00 p.m. that night. (Robinson Deposition at 50.)
The power was not cut for repair purposes until sometime after 5:00 p.m. (Robinson Deposition at 50.)
Plaintiff's complaint against Flowell is based in part
upon Flowell's negligent failure to have someone available or to take steps that would have permitted the contractor to contact its personnel in the event of need, particularly when Flowell had actual notice of the type of
work involved, the approximate time it would be undertaken, and the great danger which would exist if the
power were not cut. Flowell should have known that
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the contractor might act unreasonably or negligently in
the resulting pressure situation after being unable to
contact a single representative from its office or plant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS NEGLIGENCE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE
TRIER OF FACT.
Respondent alleged below that Toma v. Utah Power
& Light Co., 12 Utah 2d 278, 365 P.2d 788 (1961) was
conclusive of the issues presented in the instant case to
the extent that the facts when considered in a light most
favorable to plaintiff would not allow him to recover.
(R. 63-64.) Appellant contends that such a result can
only be reached by invoking an erroneous application
of the foreseeability test on which Toma is based.
In Toma, an action was filed against defendant utility by the administratrix of the estate of a deceased construction worker who was electrocuted on September
6, 1956, under factual conditions similar to those in the
instant case. The lower court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict and refused to submit the case
to the jury. Plaintiff's subsequent appeal raised two issues both of which were discussed extensively by the
court:
1. Was the trial court correct in refusing to submit the issue of defendant's alleged negligence to
the jury?
2. Was the trial court correct in deciding that
the sole proximate cause of the death of Fred R.
5
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Shook, Jr. was the negligence of certain employees
of the Mountain States Construction Company? 12
Utah 2d at 282, 365 P.2d at 791.
In the Toma opinion, this court defined the defendant power company's duty as follows:
It is well known that one dealing with electricity deals with a force of dangerous character and
that there is a constant risk of injury to persons
or property if not properly controlled. The care
observed must be commensurate with and proportionate to the danger. Therefore, the defendant
company was obliged to meet a high standard
of care, which was greater in some cases than another depending on the exigency of the service
rendered. This duty the defendant owed to Fred
R. Shook, Jr. at the time of and before his death
when and while he was employed in the vicinity
of defendant's wires. Its duty to avoid accidents
could have been discharged by doing one of the
following: (1) insulating high tension wires in
the construction zone or (2) raising these wires
in the construction zone to a point of safety or
(3) by using hot tops to cut off, turn off, or deaden
its high tension wires during the time they knew
that employees were required to work in the vicinity of the wires, or take other equally effective
means for prevention of injury. Obviously it
would not be required to comply with all these
requirements because any one which would remove the danger would be sufficient. We have
stated in Stone v. Union Pa. Railroad the test of
liability respecting consequences flowing from a
particular act or failure to act. It was the duty
of the defendant under existing conditions to exercise a high degree of care to maintain its wires
in such condition and in such a way as to avoid
accidents. A high degree of foresight is required
6
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because of the character and behavior of electricity. 12 Utah 2d at 282-83, 365 P.2d at 791-92
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
The court next considered the issue of defendant's
breach and concluded that although the power company
must be notified of changed conditions before it can be
held liable, 12 Utah 2d at 283, 365 P.2d at 792, the company nevertheless has "the obligation to keep themselves
informed generally of changing conditions and circumstances." 12 Utah 2d at 284, 365 P.2d at 792 (emphasis
added).
In Toma, it was undisputed that two telephone numbers of defendant's offices were posted on the construction site to be used for making requests to turn off the
power. 12 Utah 2d at 281, 365 P.2d at 790. Furthermore, the utility had previously complied with requests
to install hot tops to de-energize the wires, to place a
pole in a river bed to lift the wires, and to turn the power
off. 12 Utah 2d at 280-81, 365 P.2d at 790. The ultimate breach issue in Toma was whether the company
had actually received notice to cut the power on the fatal
day but nevertheless refused. 12 Utah 2d at 284-85, 365
P.2d at 792-93. Resolution of this question, the court
held, was for the jury. 12 Utah 2d at 285, 365 P.2d at
793.
When the prudent behavior of the power company's
representatives in Toma is compared to the conduct of
Flowell's representatives in the instant case, the contrast
is striking. In the case at bar, for example, the facts indicate that:

7
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1. Flowell's manager refused to move the power
lines out of the danger area upon request. (Robinson Deposition at 17.)
2. The high tension wires in the construction area
were uninsulated. (Robinson Deposition at 54-55.)
3. Hot tops or other mechanisms to deaden the wires
were not installed.
4. Flowell's manager did not warn Cox Construction of the danger. (Robinson Deposition at 39.)
5. Flowell's manager did not instruct Cox regarding safety precautions in the danger area. (Robinson Deposition at 52-53.)
6. Flowell had no personnel available at its main
office during reasonable working hours on the day of
the tragedy even though it knew that the cement pouring
operation was imminent. (Robinson Deposition at 46,
50; Cox Deposition at 32.)
7. Flowell left no notice posted at its office or
otherwise to inform Cox where he could reach company
personnel in case of need or emergency.
8. Flowell's manager did not make his home telephone number available to Brent Cox. (Cox Deposition
at 25; Robinson Deposition at 43-44.)
9. Flowell's personnel were so inaccessible on the
day in question that not even the county sheriff could
locate them until 5:00 p.m. that night. (Robinson Deposition at 49-50.)

8
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Plaintiff submits that the trial court should have
allowed the trier of fact to decide whether the conduct of
Flowell's representatives as aforesaid, constituted a breach
of its duty to keep itself informed of changing conditions
and to exercise a high degree of care to maintain its
wires in such a way as to avoid injury to construction
workers.
POINT II
THE ISSUE OF PROXIMATE
CAUSE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE
TRIER OF FACT.
As in Toma, the second issue on this appeal is
whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of
law that the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injury
was the negligence of his immediate employer. In Toma,
the Utah Supreme Court relied heavily on a proximate
cause analysis set out at length in Hillyard v. Utah Byproducts Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P. 2d 287 (1953). In
that case an action was brought to recover damages for
the death of an automobile passenger who was killed
when the automobile in which he was riding crashed into
defendant's truck which was parked so that its rear end
extended five feet onto the paved portion of the highway.
In holding that the issue whether the automobile driver's
negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injury
should have been submitted to the jury, the court cited
Professor Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 Harv. L. Rev*
1225,1229 (1937) with approval:
The earlier of the two wrongdoers, even though
his wrong has merely set the stage on which
the later wrongdoer acts to the plaintiff's injury,
9
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is in most jurisdictions no longer relieved from
responsibility merely because the later act of the
wrongdoer has been a means by which his own
misconduct was made harmful. The test has come
to be whether the later act, which realized the
harmful potentialities of the situation created by
the defendant, was itself foreseeable.
The court also cited Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as
Superseding Cause, 86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 121 (1937), and
Section 447 of the Restatement of Torts (1934) for the
proposition that foreseeability depends on whether, in
retrospect, the intervening act does not appear to be
"particularly unusual" or "highly extraordinary." Hillyard, 1 Utah 2d at 149, 263 P.2d at 291. See also Annot.,
69 A.L.R.2d 93 (I960) for a discussion of the foreseeability test in the context of the instant case.
In applying the foregoing foreseeability test to the
factual context where an automobile driver negligently
crashes into a negligently parked truck, the court cited
the Pennsylvania case of Kline v. Moyer, 325 Pa. 357,
191 A. 43, 111 A.L.R. 406 (1937), as authority for the
following distinction:
In applying the test of foreseeability to situations
where a negligently created pre-existing condition
combines with a later act of negligence causing
an injury, the courts have drawn a clear-cut distinction between two classes of cases. The first
situation is where one has negligently created a
dangerous condition [such as parking the truck]
and a later actor observed, or circumstances are
such that he could not fail to observe, but negligently failed to avoid it. The second situation
involves conduct of a later intervening actor who
negligently failed to observe the dangerous con10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dition until it is too late to avoid it. In regard
to the first situation it is held as a matter of law
that the later intervening act does interrupt the
natural sequence of events and cut off the legal
effect of the negligence of the initial actor. This
is based upon the reasoning that it is not reasonably to be foreseen nor expected that one who
actually becomes cognizant of a dangerous condition in ample time to avert injury will fail to do
so. On the other hand, with respect to the second situation, where the second actor fails to see
the danger in time to avoid it, it is held that a
jury question exists, based on the rationale that
it can reasonably be anticipated that circumstances
may arise wherein others may not observe the dangerous condition until too late to escape it. The
distinction is basically one between a situation
in which the second actor has sufficient time,
after being charged with knowledge of the hazard, to avoid it, and one in which the second
actor negligently becomes confronted with an
emergency situation. 1 Utah 2d at 151, 263 P.2d
at 292 (footnotes omitted).
As the foregoing language plainly indicates, the
court in Hillyard was relying on a method of identifying
"highly extraordinary'' or unforeseeable conduct which
basically evaluates two related factors: awareness of danger and time to avoid it. Thus the liability of the original actor is conditioned solely on whether the intervening actor has sufficient time to avoid the harm after
becoming aware of the danger. If the intervening actor
has sufficient time to avoid the harm but nevertheless
negligently fails to avoid it, the original actor is relieved
of liability as a matter of law since such conduct is presumed to be "highly extraordinary" and therefore un11
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foreseeable. But if the intervening actor has insufficient
time to avoid the harm, the issue of superseding cause
goes to the trier of fact.
Appellant contends that although the Hillyard
method of identifying "highly extraordinary" conduct
may be adequate for determining foreseeability in cases
where an automobile crashes into a parked truck, it is
woefully inadequate in cases where a construction worker
is electrocuted by inadvertent contact with energized high
tension lines. In the auto cases, for example, it seems
clear in retrospect that it is "highly extraordinary" for
a driver to smash broadside into a parked truck when
he has had sufficient time after becoming aware of the
hazard to avoid it. See e.g., Anderson v. Parson Red-EMix Paving Co., 24 Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970); Velasquez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., Yl Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d
989 (1961); Nyman v. Cedar City, 12 Utah 2d 45, 361 P.2d
1114 (1961); McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400,
346 P.2d 711 (1959). In these cases the only relevant
factors bearing on the "highly extraordinary" conduct
of the driver are awareness and time. In the construction cases, however, awareness and time are only two
of a myriad of relevant factors bearing on the question
whether the intervening actor's negligence was "highly
extraordinary" or unforeseeable. The instant case provides a solid example.
In the case at bar, 2 the record demonstrates that
Flowell Electrical Association, Inc., was aware that the
2
These factors are also discussed in Olsen v. Industrial
et al., Case No. 13867, Brief of Appellant at 8-13.

Commission,
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overpass was going to be constructed in close proximity
to its wires, and if the crane were utilized, it would
have to operate close to or underneath the energized lines.
(Robinson Deposition at 22-24, 41.) The company also
knew that the boom would have to be extended, that
workmen would be required to be near the crane to
handle the cement bucket leading from the boom, and
if the boom should inadvertently contact the uninsulated
wires, 14,400 volts of electricity would be discharged
through the boom and into any person in close proximity
to the crane. (Robinson Deposition at 22-24, 41, 50.)
Knowing these facts, Flowell still failed to maintain
an agent at the construction site while the equipment
was operating in the area of those wires. Further, it
failed to kill the wires or make arrangements for bypassing them until construction in that area had terminated. Instead, it selected an alternate course of action
whereby it would kill the wires only after being notified
by the contractor that the boom was being used in the
immediate area. (Robinson Deposition at 22-23.) Finally, after selecting this alternate course, which plaintiff
submits was fraught with danger, Flowell compounded
the hazard by failing to insure that it could be contacted
and informed when the boom was being moved into the
immediate area of the wires.
Plaintiff submits that a reasonable, prudent person
would have realized that this alternate course created an
unreasonable risk of harm to persons working in proximity to the wires. It is common knowledge that highway construction contractors are under a duty to per13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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form within a specific time and are not able to delay
their work without severe financial repercussions. This
is particularly so in an area where weather plays an
important part in determining when construction work
may be done, so that contractors must take advantage of
all available working hours. This pressure to keep crews
working is compounded where, as here, the contractor
is dealing with construction materials such as hardening
cement which must be used within a fairly short time
period. Finally, the facts demonstrate that on the date
of the tragedy, the contractor utilized every reasonable
means to contact Flowell's agent in order to have the
power killed while the crane and boom were being used
in close proximity to its wires. The contractor had no
way of knowing whether Flowell's agents had absented
themselves from their office or their homes for merely
an hour or a day, or whether their absence would be
substantially protracted. Due to this lack of knowledge,
the contractor did not act unpredictably in deciding to
proceed with the construction in spite of the possible
dangers.
Plaintiff submits that based on these additional relevant factors, reasonable minds could differ whether a
reasonable, prudent electric company should have anticipated such conduct. Plaintiff further submits that unless
such additional factors are considered, a realistic, adequate and fair determination of the foreseeability question is impossible. As Chief Justice Wade observed in
his dissent in Toma:
Here, the facts are very different from the facts
in the Hillyard case. The rule that a person who
does a static negligent act cannot reasonably fore14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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see that such act will be a contributing cause of
an accident where the person who does the intervening act knew of the static negligence is only
applicable where the static negligence creates danger which is so obvious, and the likelihood that
it will be avoided so clear, that the accident cannot
be reasonably foreseen. This rule is only invoked
under those circumstances and in applying it we
must keep in mind that foreseeability is the standard test and that knowledge of the static negligence by the intervening tortfeasor can make his
negligence the sole proximate cause only where
with such knowledge it is clear that the original
actor could not reasonably foresee that such an
accident might occur. 12 Utah 2d at 290, 365
P.2d at 796 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff respectfully submits that when all the facts
bearing on the contractor's intervening conduct are evaluated, the likelihood that he would halt the concrete
pouring operation indefinitely and thereby avoid the danger is far from clear as a matter of law. The issue of
proximate cause, therefore, should have been submitted
to the trier of fact.
POINT III
THE LAW OF LEGAL CAUSATION HAS
CHANGED SINCE TOMA v. UTAH POWER
& LIGHT CO. WAS DECIDED
The Toma case was decided in 1961. Since that
time the Restatement of Torts, Second, has been adopted
by the American Law Institute, and plaintiff alleges that
it is reasonable for the court to adopt the Restatement
Second position as it accepted the earlier Restatement
view at the time Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co. was
decided.
15
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In Hillyard, the Utah Supreme Court cited the old
Restatement and relied upon the foreseeability test as set
forth in that authority and as stated by Professor Eldredge. 1 Utah 2d at 149, 263 P.2d at 291. Since Hillyard and Toma, however, the Restatement of Torts, Second, has rejected the narrow foreseeability test. Section
435 of the Second Restatement now provides:
(1) If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor
in bringing about harm to another, the fact that
the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which
it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.
(2) The actor's conduct may be held not to be
a legal cause of harm to another where after the
event and looking back from the harm to the
actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the court
highly extraordinary that it should have brought
about the harm.
Whether the intervening actor's conduct is "highly extraordinary" is determined by the following test:
Where it appears to the court in retrospect that
it is highly extraordinary that an intervening
cause has come into operation, the court may declare such a force to be a superseding cause. (See
§442(b).) Analytically, the highly extraordinary
nature of the result which has followed from the
actor's conduct (with or without the aid of an
intervening force) indicates that the hazard which
brought about or assisted in bringing about that
result was not among the hazards with respect to
which the conduct was negligent. (See §§451 and
468.) Strictly, the problem before the court is
one of determining whether the duty imposed on
the actor was designed to protect the one harmed
from the risk of harm from the hazard in question.
Restatement of Torts, Second §435, Comment c.
16
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In light of the Second Restatement position, the issue of whether Cox Construction Company's negligence
was such as to absolve Flowell of any liability is best determined in light of the new Section 442 B which provides:
Where the negligent conduct of the actor [Flowell} creates or increases the risk of a particular
harm and is a substantial factor in causing that
harm, the fact that the harm is brought about
through the intervention of another force [Cox
Construction} does not relieve the actor [Flowell}
of liability, except where the harm is intentionally
caused by a third person and is not within the
scope of the risk created by the actor's conduct.
(Emphasis and brackets added.)
Thus Flowell is not relieved of liability if found
negligent, unless Cox Construction or the crane operator
intended to electrocute plaintiff and this harm was not
within the scope of the risk created by Flowell. It has
not been asserted by any party, however, nor is there
evidence that would support the contention that the
boom of the crane was purposefully brought in contact
with the high tension wires with intent to injure plaintiff.
With respect to the second part of the requirement which
would bar Flowell's negligence as a legal cause, i.e., that
the harm to plaintiff was not within the scope of the
risk created by Flowell, the following Restatement provision is relevant:
It is enough that the act is a normal consequence
of the situation created by the actor's negligence.
If it is done by the person who is harmed and is
unreasonable in the sense above stated, it may
amount to contributory negligence which as such
prevents him from recovering (see §467), but the
actor's negligent conduct is nonetheless the legal
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cause of the harm. If the act is done by a third
person {in this case Cox Construction} its unreasonable character may make htm as well as the
actor whose negligence created the situation liable
to the person harmed thereby. Restatement of
Torts, Second §443, Comment a (emphasis and
brackets added).
Under the Second Restatement, therefore, instead of
absolving Flowell of liability, any negligence on the part
of Cox Construction could render it (unless a claim against
Cox is barred by Workmen's Compensation), as well as
Flowell, liable to the plaintiff. Referring to such an intervening act such as that committed by Cox and whether
it will constitute the superseding and sole legal cause,
the Second Restatement authors have stated:
In order that the reaction of human beings to
the stimulus of a situation be normal it is not necessary that the situation be such as to make it
justifiable or reasonable. It may be normal for a
human being to react to the stimulus of a situation by an act which, no matter how carefully done,
may involve an unreasonable risk of harm to the
person doing it or to others. Such an act, if done
by the person suffering the harm, may be contributory fault which prevents him from recovering
(see §467), or, if done by a third person, may subject him to liability to the person harmed. Restatement of Torts, Second §443, Comment c (emphasis added).
In determining whether the intervening act of Cox
is to be considered the superseding cause, Section 442
of the Second Restatement sets forth certain factors to
be considered by the trier of fact:
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The following considerations are of importance in
determining whether an intervening force is a
superseding cause of harm to another:
(a) the fact that its intervention brings harm
different in kind from that which would otherwise
have resulted from the actor's negligence;
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences
thereof appear after the event to be extraordinary
rather than normal in view of the circumstances
existing at the time of its operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating
independently of any situation created by the
actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is
not a normal result of such a situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening
force is due to a third person's act or to his failure
to act;
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to
an act of a third person which is wrongful toward
the other and as such subjects the third person to
liability to him;
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act
of a third person which sets the intervening force
in motion.
Each of the above factors has not been established in
favor of Flowell as a matter of law. Flowell's own manager
admitted in his deposition that he knew that the work
would be dangerous for the workmen if the power were
not cut. (Robinson Deposition at 38.) He also admitted
that the local sheriff had wanted to contact him on the day
the incident happened due to the emergency presented by
the damaged wire, but was unable to do so until 5:00
p.m. (Robinson Deposition at 49-50.) He also stated that
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he knew that work under the wires was imminent because he had wondered why he had not yet been contacted to cut the power. (Robinson Deposition at 46.)
Brent Cox said he estimated the height of the wires to be
50 - 60 feet (Cox Deposition at 38) instead of the 27 or
29 feet as stated by Robinson. (Robinson Deposition at
54-55.) Cox also stated that he thought the crane was
going no higher than halfway below the wires and above
the deck. (Cox Deposition at 39.) Cox further testified
that the cement may remain in the trucks from an hour to
an hour and a half depending on the temperature before
the trucks or the cement would be damaged. (Cox Deposition at 54-55.) Under these circumstances, plaintiff asserts
that at the very least he should be given opportunity to
present his evidence before a decision can be made as a
legal certainty that no jury question exists.
Plaintiff asserts that the Restatement Second position is and should be the law in Utah and that the trier of
fact's consideration of the factors set forth above should determine whether Flowell's negligence constitutes a legal
cause of plaintiff's injury.

CONCLUSION
The issues of defendant's negligence and proximate
causation should have been submitted to the trier of fact
for the following reasons:
1. Reasonable minds may differ whether defendant,
Flowell Electrical Association, Inc., breached its duty to
exercise a "high degree of care" to keep itself informed of
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changing conditions and maintain its wires in such a way
as to avoid harm to construction workers.
2. Reasonable minds may differ whether the intervention of Cox Construction was so "highly extraordinary"
under the pressure situation involved as to constitute a
superseding cause of plaintiff's harm.
3. The court should broaden the test of foreseeability set forth in the Hillyard and Toma decisions to
take into account other relevant factors besides awareness
of danger and time to avoid it.
4. The court should adopt Sections 435, 442 and
443 of the Restatement of Torts, Second, as the law of
legal causation properly governing this case.
Plaintiff respectfully prays the court to reverse the
summary judgment entered against him and to remand
the case for trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
W. Eugene Hansen
G. Richard Hill
HANSEN AND ORTON
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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